Why There Cannot be Any Such Thing as “Time Travel" by Read, Rupert
 Why There Cannot be Any Such Thing as 
“Time Travel” 
 




Extending work of Wittgenstein, Lakoff and Johnson I suggest that it is 
the (spatial) metaphors we rely on in order to conceptualise time that 
provide an illusory space for time-travel-talk. For example, in the “Moving 
Time” spatialisation of time, “objects” move past the agent from the future 
to the past. The objects all move in the same direction – this is mapped to 
time always moving in the same direction. But then it is easy to imagine 
suspending this rule, and asking why the objects should not start moving 
in the opposite direction. This is one way of generating the idea of 
time-travel “back” into the past. Time-travel-talk essentially involves the 
unaware projection of fragments of our time-talk – taken from powerful 
conceptual metaphors – onto the nature of reality itself. Understanding 




Part I: The Future 
(1) You want to travel forward in time. You want to see the future. You 
want to be there. 
(2) OK; so you employ a time-machine to zip a hundred years into the 
future. 
(3) But suppose there is another way (perhaps less hazardous, perhaps 
more feasible)? It may become possible within some of our lifetimes 
for human beings to be cryogenically preserved for long periods, 
without suffering any physical deterioration. If you could be frozen 
for a hundred years and then wake up, then why not call that 
“time-travel”? 
(4) For it seems to bring about exactly what one wanted out of time- 
travel, out of the “time-machine” concept. One moves (as it seems, 
from the experiential point of view) forward into the future just like 
that (A time-machine would be of little use, in which one aged at 
exactly the same rate as time sped forward . . .). Is there then any 
 
  
good reason not to call a cryogenic preservation unit a “time- 
machine”? 
(5) It seems not. But now, consider: what is cryogenesis, except a long 
dreamless sleep in which the body-self does not deteriorate? But, 
given that, then why not call simply going to sleep travelling through 
time into the future? (Especially (but not only?) if one goes to sleep 
for a long time . . . And this of course is hardly an original idea. 
Think of Sleeping Beauty. Or of Rip van Winkle. My argument in the 
present paper poses no objection at all to such stories or to “time- 
travel” tales structurally similar to them.) 
(6) It will perhaps be objected that while one is asleep one has dreams. 
It is not altogether clear that this is an objection at all, given that 
time-travel for people is usually conceptualised as “continuous,” that 
is, as having a subjective duration, albeit not usually a very long 
duration.... So it need not differ that much from a night’s sleep in 
which one dreams some. But in any case, there is the phenomenon 
of the dreamless sleep. (Or at least, there could be: Descartes was 
surely wrong to deny its very possibility.) So still, why not at least call 
such sleep “time-travel”? 
(7) It will be objected that the body ages during sleep. But there is good 
biological evidence to doubt that this is straightforwardly or 
unequivocally true. Much sleep is actually renewing of our organism. 
(Whereas, if consistently deprived of sleep, one simply dies in a 
remarkably short time: apparently, somewhere between about 10 days 
and 10 months. Sleeping less severely risks shortening your life. And: 
Those of us who have experienced the slow torment of hour after 
hour insomnia would give a lot, instead, to travel quickly forward to 
the next morning, via healthy natural sleep.) 
(8) Therefore, there seems no good reason to withhold the term “time- 
travel” from healthy, body-renewing sleep, especially perhaps if it is 
relatively dreamless. You really can travel to the future. You can see 
the future.You can be there. Just by going to bed; just by living long 
enough. (One could perhaps even go one step further. One could of 
course say that we are all time-travelling all the time, just by virtue 
of living. Each second that I live, I travel further into the future.) 
(9) But this seems an absurd or at least an unsatisfying conclusion. 
When we initially spoke of “time-travel,” we did not want to 
license the conclusion that simply (say) going to sleep was worth 
calling “travelling through time.” What element is missing? What do 
we want out of the concept of “time-travel” that going to sleep 
does not yield us? 
(10) What in sleep is missing from time-travel is the essential element of 
any travel worthy of the name, of tourism and holidaying for instance: 
  
the ability, at least, to go there and back again. The reason, I believe, 
why the conclusion that going to sleep is as much travelling through 
time as is going to the future in a time-machine is repugnant is that 
we are only prepared to call going to the future “travelling through 
time” if we can potentially return from the trip. 
(11) This implies that time-travel into the future is not enough. (Thus, the 
“twin paradox” poses no problem at all for my argument. That one 
twin ages less than another, and can in that sense be regarded as 
having time-travelled into the future, is not consequentially different 
from their having undergone cryogenesis.1 Time-travel into the 
future is not really time-travel, not really what we wanted when we 
desired to travel into the future; unless you can come back again too, 
not just to meet your twin, but rather (say) to meet your twin when 
they were younger than when you set out. Or alternatively, of course: 
to meet yourself before you set out.) In short: To actually be willing 
to continue to apply the term “time-travel” to any activity, one 
requires that one can voyage and return. This implies directly that 
one will not on reflection countenance speaking of time-travel into 
the future unless one can already also countenance speaking of 
time-travel into the past. For, once we arrive in the future (e.g. after 
a good night’s sleep, or through other means), it is pointless to speak 
of our having travelled through time unless we can return into what 
has become the past. 
(12) Therefore, in order to determine whether or not it makes sense to 
talk about time-travel, we are compelled to consider whether or not 
it makes sense to talk about travelling into the past. 
 
 
Part II: The Past 
(i) You want to travel back in time.You want to see the past.You want 
to be there. 
(ii) OK; so you employ a time-machine to zip a hundred years into the 
past. 
(iii) But a problem immediately arises. You want(-ed) to travel into the 
past. Into your past. Not into some parallel universe, not into virtual 
reality. Into the past; you do not want to change anything/ 
everything such that what you are travelling into is some different 
 
1. For further detail on why “time-dilation” does not amount to time-travel, see note 1 
of my “Against ‘time-slices’, ” in this journal, Philosophical Investigations (Read 2003). See also 
Ch. 19 of Vyvyan Evans’s (2003), especially p. 249, for an interesting argument drawing the 
sting from Special Relativity in this connection. 
  
history. But how can you venture into the past without changing it? 
(This point may bring to mind “Niven’s Law” of time-travel, that 
time-travel erases itself, because time-travel back “into the past” 
could never be into the very past into which one wanted to travel. 
But my claim here will be more radical: I am suggesting that what 
this really means is just that there is and can be nothing worth your 
actually on reflection calling time-travel, at all.) 
(iv) For: you already know that there is no record in the past of you 
having been there, nor of anyone else from the future, no matter 
how distant or technologically-sophisticated that future becomes. 
(v) Maybe you (or they) travelled there very quietly and carefully? 
Maybe you made no impact? 
(vi) But in order not to have changed the past, and made it something 
other than the very thing that you wanted to voyage into, you 
cannot have had any impact at all, not even one so slight that it 
evaded all records and notice. You cannot have affected the ener- 
getics of the atmosphere, the trajectories of light-beams, etc. You 
must have been entirely subtle. 
(vii) The implication seems clear: travel back into the past is only possible 
if the “you” that does the travelling is entirely ethereal. Non- 
physical. For the slightest impact upon the past will generate a 
“causal loop,” and thus a familiar paradox of time-travel. 
(viii) But now it seems questionable whether it is really you that is 
doing the “travelling.” If the only way that one can travel into the 
past is by giving up one’s bodily existence and becoming spirit, 
then (unless we make an absolute split between mind or soul and 
body, unless we are committed to some implausibly strong quasi- 
Cartesian or religious doctrine) it seems highly questionable that it 
can mean anything at all to talk about travelling back into the 
past. For there is no genuine person – no you or I – who can 
intelligibly be regarded as undertaking such a journey. 
(ix) If we imagine ourselves as pure spirits observing the past, then we 
would be pure observers, not genuinely able in any way whatsoever 
to be involved in the past. (For example: we then cannot feel anything 
physical, for fear of altering the past, such that it is no longer the very 
“place” that we wished to “go” to.“Our” supposed “journey” into the 
past (and, presumably, to be of any use to us and to others, back again, 
to the present, to our embodied selves) could not involve any change 
at all in our actual physical existence as we are, alive, here and now – 
the “you” that travels back into the past has very little connection, it 
seems, with the flesh-and-blood you reading this paper.) Indeed, there 
is a very serious issue about whether one can make sense at all even 
of the concept of being a “pure observer.” For what is it that then 
  
observers, and how?: Can such an “observer” see anything? Hear 
anything?2 Surely one would not really be there, and could not truly 
be said to observe anything at all. 
(x) But perhaps all is not lost; for, in this case (i.e. vis-a-vis the past), it 
seems nevertheless that there is something that it can be – that it can 
mean – to speak of us – the actual people, flesh-and-blood creatures, 
that we are – travelling back into the past. Namely: seeing photo- 
graphs, watching films, reading archaeological evidence, etc. As Frank 
Ebersole remarks: “A dramatic archaeology professor might say ‘We 
are looking at the distant past’ while displaying some unusually 
realistic paintings of pre-historic man”3, etc. Some would say the 
same, while looking at the stars.4 (One might of course also speak of 
travelling through time, into past or future, by means of dreams, 
stories, memories, prophecies, etc. I have no principled objection to 
that.) 
(xi) You really can see the past: exactly as it has come down to us. One 
might put it this way: one already has in one’s possession a time- 
machine, if one has a camera – or a photo-album. (And in any case: 
If all you want to see is something resembling the past, then certainly 
photos and paintings, etc. are quite good enough. As good as “going 
back into the past” – such that it was inevitably only something 
resembling what you wanted to “travel back into” that you saw, not 
the thing itself – would be . .  .) 
(xii) In other words: just as there is no good reason not to use the term 
“travelling into the future” to describe the phenomenon of going to 
sleep, unless we (quite reasonably – see sections 10–12, in Part I, 
 
2. Compare for instance P. F. Strawson’s useful argument in Ch. 2 of his (Strawson 1959). 
And Ebersole’s at p. 114 of his Ebersole (1979). As I point out in section (x), below: a real 
person could not only observe, but can moreover under some circumstances be meaning- 
fully said to observe the past. 
3. p. 526 of Ebersole’s “How philosophers see stars” in his Ebersole (1979). 
4. I allude here to the view of A. J. Ayer (e.g.,The Problem of Knowledge (Ayer 1956) pp. 
94–5), and similar views in Chisholm (see p. 153 of his Chisholm (1957)), Russell (see 
Human Knowledge, its scope and limits (Russell 1948), p. 205f.) and Whitehead, to the 
effect that we can know/see the past, and indeed only the past. These views are beautifully 
presented, dissected and their attractions greatly diminished, in and by Frank Ebersole’s 
“How philosophers see stars” (Ebersole 1979). In effect, my argument in the present paper 
explores a corollary of Ebersole’s line of thinking. If philosophers and others are so keen to 
“travel through time,” then they might as well just look outside the window at night. For it is in 
a certain (albeit a stretched, and as Ebersole so patiently argues, ultimately probably dissat- 
isfying, misleading) sense true that we are seeing events that happened earlier, when we do 
so. Only: this is of course still most unlikely to satisfy the one who wanted to “travel 
through time.” And the reason why this is so, is the very reason that Ebersole presses: 
because saying that we see the past when we see the stars is in the end likeliest merely to 
be a piece of (merely) linguistic/lexicographic revisionism, not in any sensical sense an 
exciting discovery. 
  
above) insist upon being able then to travel back into (what has then 
become) the past, so there is no good reason not to use the term 
“travelling into the past” to describe being pure observers of the 
past, without affecting it, as we can observe the past in numerous 
ways already: in old footage, in art, and so on, plus of course by 
means of others’ recollections (and our own). But, once more, this 
will seem unsatisfactory (and quite reasonably so!), not what we 
wanted when we spoke of “travelling into the past.”When we used 
the term “time-travel” to refer to “travelling back into the past,” we 
did not want to end up only (making sense by talking about) 
looking at old photographs, etc. 
(xiii) But this is the best that we can mean. 
(xiv) Therefore there is (and can be) no such thing as travelling into the 
past in the sense in which we imagined (that we imagined) that 
there could be. 
(xv) Therefore (given also sections 11 and 12 in Part I, above), there is 
and can be no such thing as time-travel. For what was necessary in 
order for us to be willing to call something “time-travel” (namely, 
its being meaningful to speak of travel “back into the past”) is just 
not available. Our relation to the past is necessarily spectatorial, in a 
doubled sense: We cannot interfere with it, and we cannot even 
observe it except from a temporal distance. It turns out that it means 
nothing to suppose otherwise. (This is why our statements about the 
past are truth-apt, and have an “answerability” (in roughly Travis’s 
sense of that word) – to something independent of us. This is the 
reality of the past, and it directly implies the wrong-headedness of 
constructivism about the past.) 
(xvi) By rough analogy with Russell’s paradox, we might put the 
insoluble problem in this way: The creator/user of a time-machine 
has set herself a non-existent task. She has to travel back into the 
past of all those people who do not travel back into their own pasts.5 
If she is such a person, then she is not. 
 
 
5. Bradley Monton’s “many-particle” argument (“Time travel without causal loops” 
(Monton 2007)), does not refute this point. For (as one sees, on closely inspecting pp. 59–60 
of his paper), the particles he therein describes as time-travelling do not really travel back 
into their own pasts. They travel through space as well, into adjoining regions or edge- 
regions, and without their doing so Monton’s argument would not work. Monton has no 
argument that enables a particle to travel back into the past (without generating a causal 
loop) except by simultaneously travelling to a region of space closed from the region that 
the particle originated in. (In practice, a different universe. Monton only manages to 
counter the presumption that he is presupposing a different universe by proposing particles 
that do not interact with any other particles – in effect, much the same as my pure-spirit 
would-be observers in sections (vi) – (ix), above.) 
  
Part III: Diagnosis 
(a) The future is not a place that you can go – let alone come back from 
(There are no return tickets). A general underlying problem here, as 
I have explained and explored in previous work, is the suspect way in 
which we are continually tempted to use terms whose employment 
we only perspicuously understand spatially (e.g.“travel,”“forward” and 
“back”6) in order to allegedly make sense of matters temporal.7 
We understand what travelling is – through space. When we 
project this “language-game” into “the 4th dimension,” then we 
potentially set ourselves up for all sort of headaches. For actually, time 
is, as we might therapeutically put it, a device for rating changes.8 
(Changes that occur in space.) It was never intended to be regarded 
as an independent medium that one can travel in or through. As a 
result, it should not greatly surprise us that incoherences tend to 
multiply when one tries to take time-travel-tales seriously. What it 
would mean to travel “through time” has just not been carefully 
thought through. For instance, while time-travelling, one remains, typi- 
cally, fixed in space. But hang on: the Earth is flying through space all 
 
6. “Time”s arrow’ points only in one direction: thus there is something deeply suspect 
about what we are wanting to do, in using terms such as “back” (and not being content only 
with terms such as ‘forward’) in relation to “time-travel.” For, if we speak of the twin who 
travels to near a black hole as travelling forward through time, this at least will be harmless, 
so long as we do not then expect there to be such a thing as travelling backward through time that 
symmetrically mirrors what the twin undergoes. (See also on this note 60 of my Read (2007).) 
7. Cf. Frank Ebersole’s “The precarious reality of the past,” which (at pp. 136–141 of his 
Things we know (in his Ebersole 1967)) explains further the attractions of the spatial and 
place-like pictures of past and future. (See also Part 3.2 of my Read (2007).) As I make clear 
there, it should not be assumed by my saying that there is always something potentially 
problematic about modelling time on space that I am going into competition with 
Einsteinian physics. For instance, at the most basic level: talk of “time-lines” and spatial 
mapping of them certainly need not cause any problems at all, so long as we take care (on 
which, see p.82f. of my Read 2007). And it is even harmless to talk of time as a dimension 
so long as (as physicists generally do) one distinguishes between time and “time-like dimen- 
sions” on the one hand and space and “space-like dimensions” on the other hand. I am only 
issuing some warning signs (reminding that employment of the word “dimension” for 
instance does not guarantee that all aspects of what one is talking about can be modelled 
on our pre-existing understanding of three dimensions, and that otherwise talk of “the 4th 
dimension” will be misleading) and putting down some kind of prose “constraint” on what 
physics can successfully mean, beyond its maths, its geometry. I am of course not constrain- 
ing physics from anything – for nonsense is not any kind of realm at all. It is only an absence 
of successful sense-making (Cf. section III b, below.) 
8. For further exposition, see p. 93 of my (Read 2007): A therapy for our habit of 
substantialising time, and turning it into a medium, is, as I put it there, to think “of time as 
at base involving comparative statements.” (See also III h, below.) Wittgenstein’s (1922) 
Tractatus is also a helpful antecedent here; see especially 6.3611: “We cannot compare any 
process with the ‘passage of time’ – there is no such thing – but only with another process 
(say, with the movement of the chronometer). // Hence the description of the temporal 
sequence of events is only possible if we support ourselves on another process.” 
  
the time. How come, when one travels back into the past or forward 
into the future, one still magically ends up being on the Earth?9 
(b) A substantial body of work in linguistically-oriented so-called 
“Cognitive Science” now exists that can help us to understand 
section (a), above. When extended as I am in effect extending it here, 
this body of work can help us therapeutically diagnose and dissolve 
away the attractions of time-travel-talk. The founding text is Lakoff 
and Johnson’s (1980) Metaphors we live by,10 which powerfully argues 
the case that the way in which we develop temporal concepts is 
primarily through conceptual metaphors drawn from motion and (more 
generally) from spatial concepts (e.g. “Times are places”). Lakoff and 
Johnson, in that book and in subsequent work, develop the “Moving 
Time” metaphorical system and the logically-rivalrous “Moving 
Observer” metaphorical system for time. It is easy to see how these 
create an illusory space for time-travel-talk. For example, in the 
“Moving Time” spatialisation of time, “objects” move past the agent/ 
observer from the future to the past. The objects all move in the same 
direction – this is mapped to time always moving in the same 
direction. But then it is the easiest thing in the world to imagine 
suspending this rule, and ask why the objects should not start moving 
in the opposite direction. And then one generates the idea of time- 
travel “back” into the past . . .  Vyvyan Evans’s The structure of time 
(2003) takes forward, details and corrects Lakoff and Johnson’s pre- 
sentation of time. The point of departure for Evans’s investigation is 
this, pertinent, question: “Why is time lexicalised in terms of space 
and motion through three-dimensional space and not in its own 
terms”? (p. 13) Evans’s book is a detailed account of how and why 
we spatialise time. It can help afford one greater freedom with regard 
to the felt compulsion to spatialise that is so rampant in time-travel- 
talk. Time-travel-talk, I am suggesting, is a consequence of being 
gripped/captured by spatial pictures of time. Of plunging headlong into 
a spatialised view of time, without realising that one has allowed one’s 
metaphors to run away with one. Evans’s book details the various – 
the several quite different – conceptual metaphors for time, and how 
they work. Evans develops (and facilitates reflection upon) the various 
conceptions of time involved in what he calls the “duration sense” of 
 
9. What sense, moreover, does it have to speak simply of travelling through time, when one 
understands the Universe, as nowadays we do, to be something that is full of movement and 
change, something that is “unfolding” – and rapidly expanding – in time and space (in 
space-time)? (Notice that the same worry does not apply to “travelling through space”: we 
do not mean by that, travelling through space without time passing (i.e., the allegedly 
logically possible phenomenon of instantaneous  matter-transmission).) 
10. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
  
time, the “moment sense,” the “instance sense,” the “event sense,” the 
“matrix sense” of time (roughly: time in endless ongoingness), the 
“agentive sense,” and the “measurement sense” (time as measurable 
and time as measure), to name most (but not all) of the main senses 
of time that he distinguishes. I would put the upshot of his detailing 
of these roughly as follows: time is a family-resemblance concept.The 
various conceptual metaphors for time are not consistent, in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s sense of that term: they cannot be non-contradictorily 
combined into one whole. So often, what philosophers do is to take 
a few of (or just one of ) such metaphor(s), and proclaim that these/ 
this alone reflects the nature of Time, or of the universe. The great 
failure of the metaphysics of Realism and Anti-Realism with regard 
to time is of this nature: these metaphysics pretend to “capture” the 
whole nature of time when actually they each capture only a part 
of its grammar.11 Metaphysics and ontology of time (and similarly 
of other “things”) are rash over-generalisations of or reifications of 
fragments of the “metaphorical patchwork” that time is.12 The same is 
true, I would suggest, of the endurantism vs. perdurantism (or three- 
dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism) dispute within “Realism”:13 
The logic and detail of Evans’s work can help one to see that these 
would-be metaphysics of time take one particular temporal conceptual 
metaphor (invariably, with a spatial basis: such as the concept of 
having parts, or slices), and unwisely project it to “capture” the essence 
of temporality itself.That is what Evans, Lakoff, Johnson, Ebersole and 
Wittgenstein can help us to see that metaphysics of time is: the 
unaware projection of fragments of our time-talk, taken from pow- 
erful conceptual metaphors and projected onto the nature of reality 
itself. This awareness helps one achieve what Wittgenstein aimed 
always to help one achieve in philosophy: freedom from capture/ 
unaware-compulsion at the hands of deep conceptual metaphors (e.g. 
of time), without seeking, either, to leave them behind definitively. For 
that is a nonsensical goal. For, as Lakoff, Johnson and Evans teach us: 
conceptual metaphors are essential to our thought/cognition, inelim- 
inable from any thinking of above a minimal complexity. 
(c) So: to the possible objection that I am committed to dubious quasi- 
Heraclitean assumptions in the present paper, I reply: Not at all. 
Rather, what I am pointing out is that “the observer-effect” differs 
 
 
11. I argue this case in some detail at pp. 97–98 of my (Read 2007). 
12. This term, “metaphorical patchwork,” is Lakoff and Johnson’s, from p. 134 of their 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999). They add here that time is “fundamentally and inescapably 
metaphorical.” 
13. For detailed discussion, see pp. 108–109 of my (Read 2007). 
  
between time and space. It is part of what it is for there to be spatial 
entities such as rivers and buses and universities that you can step in 
and out of them from the outside. A river that you could not step 
into without it no longer being a river would not be a river at all (A 
body of water of this nature, in relation to which what Heraclitus said 
might be said to be right, would be, perhaps, a bucket of water, that 
the water mostly sloshed straight out of when you stuck your leg in 
and thereby displaced it (the water), such that it might indeed perhaps 
be reasonably said that you ccould not step into the same bucket of 
water twice.. .) But it is no part of the past that someone from the 
future was there. You can step into the same river twice, but you 
cannot step into the same moment twice (If you did, then it would 
not be the same moment). Or rather: it means nothing to “do” so 
(Unless: in memory, etc.). Clarity about conceptual metaphors for 
time makes this evident, and reveals the attraction of and the hope- 
lessness of wishing otherwise. 
(d) The more specific underlying problem that Parts I and II (above) 
bring out is that the very characteristics of the past and the future 
which make them the past and the future are the very characteristics 
which “time travel” as we would like to imagine it tries to flout. The past       
is very largely determinate,14 fixed, just by virtue of its being past: and 
“travelling back into it” requires that it not be fixed. The future is to 
a considerable extent open just by virtue of its being future: and 
“travelling forward into it” requires that we can lay down, now, fixed 
points “there,” in the future,15 as of course we would do in the 
ordinary nature of things, in the ordinary course of events, if we were 
(say) cryogenically suspended and then emerged and started doing 
things, living again. Our desires in relation to our words come to 
grief, hereabouts. We want both to be able to speak of “the past,” 
history; and for it to be present, being made. We want both to be able 
to speak of “the future,” what is to come; and for it to be present, 
now (to us). We are hovering between incompatible uses of our 
words. We have to decide how to use them. We could decide to speak 
 
 
14. I am leaving a little room open for the kind of phenomena described by Ian Hacking 
as “indeterminacies in the past,” such as whether people who had what we would now call 
“Dissociative Identity Disorder” (DID) actually can be truly and simply said to have had 
DID, before the concept was invented/discovered. See Ch. 17 of his (Hacking 1995). 
15. Ebersole’s “Was the sea battle rigged?” (in his Things we know (Ebersole 1967) is a 
wonderful diagnosis of how (wittingly or unwittingly) we can find ourselves as philosophers 
drawn to picture the future as fixed or wish it to be fixable “in advance.” We fail to 
differentiate the future adequately from the past. (See especially p. 220, against the desire to 
say that there can be fixed points in the future, things we can lay down as true, by means 
of (say) a time-machine.) 
  
of remembering things (or at least: of “flashbacks,” etc.) as travelling 
through time into the past; but it would probably usually be much 
more trouble than it was worth to do so. We could decide to speak 
of going to sleep as travelling through time into the future; but such 
revisionism would surely be pointless, or counter-productive. It seems 
better to give up (most of ) our use of the term “time-travel,” except 
to index certain fantasies that are dependent upon illusions/delusions of 
sense. 
(e) We desire to fluidise and experience “directly” the past, and to 
experience “directly” and fix the future. This is a perfectly natural 
human desire. (And it partly explains the enduring appeal of narra- 
tives of “time-travel,” from H. G. Wells to Star Trek and Dr Who and 
Back to the future and the Terminator series and so on and on.) But: it 
is perfectly hopeless. (And so: these narratives are in the end nonsense 
– from start to end.16) It does not mean anything, to travel into the 
past and kill one’s own grandfather, or to do anything else “there.” 
The great failing of David Lewis’s (1976) famous 1976 paper, “The 
paradoxes of time travel” is that (at p. 149) it abjectly fails to explain 
why it is impossible for a time-traveller to kill their grandfather. 
But on my account, a compelling reason is available to explain 
roughly this. Namely, that we have not succeeded in giving any stable 
meaning to the notion of “backward time travel.” Such that no 
meaning has been assigned to “travelling into the past” to meet and 
kill one’s grandfather; nor to “travelling into the future” to meet 
one’s own grandchild, except in the normal way (i.e. by means of 
living, and getting a decent amount of sleep en route). If one could 
travel into the future and meet one’s own grandchild (I mean a 
grandchild unconceived at the time one “left”), then one could travel 
back into her past and kill one’s sexual partner (or for that matter, 
oneself ) – the same “grandfather paradox”17 arises, as if one goes back 
into one’s own past and kills one’s own grandfather. One wants to lay 
 
 
16. Of course, there is much in these narratives that is still of value. For example: 
(1) They have of course all sorts of ethical and existential and political interest, etc.; 
(2) They sometimes seem to rise to self-reflexive awareness of their own nonsensicality, in 
ways that are interesting and harmonise with the argument of my paper: that is one type 
of value that they can have. See for instance the apparent emerging awareness in the 
recent (2009) Dr Who story The End of Time that it cannot make sense for the “Time 
Lords” to exist except as pure spirit. If one then realises that that in turn cannot make 
sense, then the concept is at an end. Except in the kind of way that we can be amused 
or boggled by nonsense-poems... which brings us to; 
(3) Perhaps most interestingly of all, they sometimes perhaps involve a deliberate nonsensi- 
cality, a deliberate running against our fantasised cage. A bringing into prominence of 
the nature of Dasein through a fantasised escape from it. 
17. Due originally to Rene Barjavel’s (1943). 
  
down fixed points in the future. One wants, hopelessly, for the future 
to have (already) happened, when one “returns” to what is then the past. 
(f ) Given this, it is perhaps worth taking a moment to reflect on why 
“time-travel” is such a relatively modern idea, more modern/recent 
than space travel. We might venture the following two speculations 
on this question: (i) It is unsurprising that space-travel has been 
thought about for a longer time; for it makes sense. (ii) In any case, 
“time-travel” is not a particularly attractive idea until one has a sense 
of a common time applying across at least one’s own country. Until 
a couple of centuries ago, there were disparate times even within 
most relatively “developed countries.” Until there is a certain 
definiteness to time, there is little sense to fantasies of travelling 
through it – because it is relatively clear that there is in the relevant 
sense no “it.” 
(g) In (e), I stressed an asymmetry between our desires vis-a-vis “travel 
into the future” on the one hand and “travel into the past” on the 
other (namely: the desires, respectively, to fix what is fluid, and to 
fluidise what is fixed).There is also a partial symmetry between them. 
Namely: To desire to visit the past is to want to really be there and 
genuinely experience i t . . .  without affecting it. It must remain fixed. 
But it cannot remain fixed if you are actually to “go” there. Similarly: 
The desire to visit the future is the fantasy that there is something 
definite going on there that is already visitable. Something that is 
fixed. But your being there and experiencing the future as something 
actually happening where people undertake actions, etc. requires that it 
be fluid. So: one wants to lay down fixed points in the past – but the 
laying down of such points stops it from actually being the (your) 
past, what you wanted to travel into. And: one wants to lay down 
fixed points in the future – but the laying down of such points 
(whether it is you or others who lay them down) stops it from 
actually being the future, what has not yet happened, what is not 
yet fixed. 
(h) “Time-travel” supposes that past events, “events in the past,” are still 
somehow there now. The past allegedly exists now, because you can 
go to it now (or could, if you had a time-machine). But: those events 
are over.You want to be present at events that are over.18 As suggested 
in (a) and (b), above, talk of “the past” and “the future” can easily 
confuse us. It may be better, when such confusion beckons, simply to 
 
18. Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson point out (at pp. 158–9 of Philosophy in the flesh, Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999) how the flow-of-time metaphysics makes the future seem like it exists 
now – thus it prepares the ground for the nonsense of time-travel to seem like it must make 
some sense. 
  
talk about before and after. That way, one can accomplish all that one 
needs to in ordinary life – and the Einsteinian physicist can say all 
that s/he needs to say, complexifying that talk – but one does not 
create the unwanted impression that the past and future are explor- 
able “countries,” in the way that time-travel tall tales typically do.That 
is the impression that one needs to overcome: that, in the sense in 
which we speak of tourism in space (or indeed space-tourism!), there 
can be time-tourism. The past is not an undiscovered or unexperi- 
enced country. 1900 is no more truly “out there (somewhere)” than 
is that elusive room that we see “inside” the mirror. Do not let 
deflationary, potentially-therapeutically-useful expressions such as 
“The past is fixed” mislead you into thinking that the past is still there 
waiting to be visited. It is precisely because there is (now) no there 
there that the past is fixed, unalterable. 
(i) It can seem that it means something to talk about “time-travel”; a 
patina or ring of sense accompanies the things one wants to say, 
including some of the things that I have said (I mean: the things/ 
stories that I have described, mentioned; the desires that I have tried 
to inhabit) in the above. But this ring of sense is only the sound (as 
if ) of sense, not the actuality of it. As with Wittgenstein’s (not 
unrelated!) question, “What time is it on the Sun?” The question 
appears well-formed. But, unless and until we find a genuine use for 
it that reflects to some degree at least the reason why we were 
inclined to ask it in the first place, the correct conclusion to draw is 
that it is actually not. It is (latent) nonsense. 
(j) It will be objected that what I seem to be saying is that because the 
grammar of our language does not accommodate time-travel then it 
(time-travel) is not possible. It will be objected, in other words, that 
I am illicitly inferring from the limits of our language to an alleged 
limit to the possible nature of our world. But I might just as well – 
just as rightly – have said this: “Because the grammar of our language 
does not accommodate sdlfhjdsfg, then sdlfhjdsfg is not possible.” 
Because, strange as it might sound, that is basically correct. Because 
sdlfhjdsfg is nonsense; it has not yet been successfully assigned any 
meaning; so “it” certainly is not possible. There is, we might usefully 
say, no “it.” And the same is true of (what we seemingly wanted to 
mean by) time-travel.What my argument tests is “only” the claim that 
it means anything (of the kind that we evidently wanted to mean) to 
talk about time-travel. Just as it does not mean anything to talk about 
sdlfhjdsfg.... Of course, in the case of sdlfhjdsfg, it is harder to 
imagine someone wanting to say that “it” is possible. But the only 
difference here is a psychological one. Sdlfhjdsfg is patent nonsense, 
time-travel is latent nonsense. 
  
(k) My thinking here is also Wittgenstein’s. Compare with my line of 
thinking in (j) his important remark that “Though it is nonsense to 
say ‘I feel his pain’, this is different from inserting into an English 
sentence a meaningless word, say ‘abracadabra’ . . . and from saying a 
string of nonsense words. Every word in [‘I feel his pain’] is English, 
and we shall be inclined to say that the sentence has a meaning. The 
sentence with the nonsense word or the string of nonsense words can 
be discarded from our language, but if we discard from our language 
‘I feel Smith’s toothache’ that is quite different. The second seems 
nonsense, we are tempted to say, because of some truth about the 
nature of the things or the nature of the world...  The task will be 
to show that there is in fact no difference between  these  two  cases  of  
nonsense, though there is a psychological distinction in  that we  are inclined to      
say the one and be puzzled by it and not the other. We constantly hover 
between regarding it as sense and nonsense, and hence the trouble 
arises.”19 
(l) An objector might continue to insist that I have shown, at most, that 
time-travel is “only” conceptually impossible. But this is just another 
version of the objection considered in (i) (and (j)). If I have succeeded 
in convincing you that our concepts do not allow for there being 
anything worth calling “time-travel,” then that is quite enough. Ges- 
tures at other we-know-now-whats or we-cannot-says are of no 
interest, no substance. Could we be completely wrong about the nature 
of time? No. Or: there is no sense that we can make out of a “Yes” 
answer to such a question. A “Yes” answer to it opens the door to 
unconstrainedly saying just anything at all that we might feel inclined 
to say, Humpty-Dumpty-style.20 
(m) So: we see that actually my title is a little inaccurate. There is of 
course no bar on using the term “time-travel.” (This point distin- 
guishes my (therapeutic, Wittgensteinian) approach clearly from a 
Hackerian approach, which would proceed rather by trying to insist 
that certain expressions simply must be taken “out of circulation,” that 
(as it were) our language itself insists on it. Whereas at every point I 
appeal to my reader: It is as you please whether or not to continue to 
use these terms (such as “time-travel”). But it seems to me that the 
attractions of so doing have (not inconsiderably) waned.) There is no 
 
19. Italics added. Quoted from unpublished Lectures of Wittgenstein’s, on p. 106 of 
Diamond, C. (1991). 
20. Those unconvinced by this, and looking for further reason to believe it, are requested 
to consult Sharrock and Read’s (2002) Kuhn, which makes the (Kuhnian) argument that it 
means nothing to contemplate giving up on our “paradigms” completely, except with a 
view to replacing them with some concrete alternative, which invariably cannibalises the 
old paradigm. 
  
word-policing going on here, no banning of talk of “time-travel”; it 
is just that “it” is unlikely to be what we (thought we) had in mind 
when we wanted to employ the term in the first place. One’s desire 
to employ the term “time-travel” is likely to shift in inverse proportion 
with  the  meaningfulness  of  the  scenario  one  is  describing  by  using  the   term. 
(n) A more accurate (though less snappy) title for the present paper might 
then be:“It is as you please21 whether you call anything ‘time-travel’ or 
not, but anything you end up successfully and sensically continuing to 
call ‘time-travel’ is not going to be the very kind of thing that made 
you want to speak of ‘time-travel’ in the first place.” 
(o) That is: in the “sense” (which turns out to be no sense at all) in which 
we have an internally-consistent desire to speak of time-travel, we 
might just as well say simply that there cannot be any such thing.22 
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